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Abstract: 
This paper critically examines how media in post-transformation countries of the CEE region 
fulfil their normative role of “watchdogs of democracy”, particularly in relation to the issue 
of political corruption, which is regarded as one of the most palpable issues the new 
democracies are coping with. Empirically, the paper is be based on an expert survey 
conducted (together with Henrik Örnebring) in 2012 in eight CEE countries, on field 
interviews with investigative journalists, as well as on a frequency analysis of media salience 
of corruption and the trends in prosecution of corruption in the Czech Republic. Drawing on 
the results from both parts of the empirical study, the paper suggests the media have a best 
chance to fulfil their watchdog role and to enforce accountability when supported by the 
effort of other accountability institutions composing a network of actors mutually reinforcing 
each other in their effort to curb political corruption. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: the role of media in enforcing political accountability 
 
The ability of the citizens to hold governments, elected representatives and other power 
holders accountable has been widely regarded as one of the crucial components and 
cornerstones of democracy (Diamond et al. 1999; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999; 
Morlino 2002; Schmitter 2007). According to democratic theory, accountability – commonly 
understood as the obligation of the public officials to inform and justify their decisions in 
front of the electorate, and the capacity of the public or responsible institutions to sanction 
their behaviour (Schedler 1999) – is one of the main measures of to the quality of democratic 
governance (Morlino 2002), and is regarded as the key mechanism in improving surveillance 
over officeholders, constraining their exercise of power and raising the overall governmental 
effectiveness (Camaj 2013: 24). As Schmitter (2007: 134) puts it, “the more accountable a 
real-existing democracy is, the higher will be the quality of its performance”. 
 
Political accountability has been conceptualized in various ways, with one of the most 
common distinctions being made between horizontal and vertical accountability (see 
O’Donnell 1999; Schedler 1999; Whitehead, 2002). The first one refers to the system of 
“checks and balances” between state institutions, public agencies and branches of 
government (judicial, executive, legislative), while the latter applies to unequal power 
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relationships and describes the ability of citizens to oversee actions of the power holders. 
While periodic elections have been traditionally regarded as the main mechanism through 
which vertical accountability is enforced in democracy, with the voters being able to replace 
the incumbent by a newly elected government, other institutions have been considered to play 
an indispensable part in vertical accountability as well, most prominently mass media and 
civil society. It is indeed a common knowledge that in the modern societies, the ability of 
voters to monitor government’s actions and to make informed decisions in the electoral 
process is itself dependent on the dissemination of information through the mass media, 
which thereby influence the electoral competition. However, it has also been pointed out that 
the media play an important role in setting the agenda for the policy making process and 
informing the decisions of the government and the judiciary (Camaj 2013), which means that 
their performance affects, directly or indirectly, mechanisms of horizontal accountability as 
well (see Morlino 2002).  
 
Both of these two types of the accountability role of the media arguably find their most potent 
expression in what is usually called investigative or accountability journalism (Ettema 2007; 
de Burgh 2008), a genre specifically concerned with close monitoring of the actions of the 
government and public officials and exposing their wrongdoings. Within this broad scope, 
investigative journalism’s “watchdog role” is typically exemplified through its efforts to fight 
corruption, commonly defined as “the abuse of public power for personal gain or for the 
benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance” (Stapenhurst 2000: 1, quoted in Camaj 
2013: 22). Free media in general, and investigative journalism in particular, are considered to 
be among the most effective mechanism of external controls on corruption (Camaj 2013: 22; 
Vachudova 2009). However, while exposing particular corruption scandals or covering the 
ongoing investigations by prosecutorial institutions and judicial authorities constitutes 
perhaps the most visible part of the media’s fight against corruption, their accountability 
function is certainly not limited to these. In fact, their effects on curbing corruption are 
thought to be mainly indirect (Camaj 2013: 23), especially through sustaining this issue in the 
public sphere and cultivating thereby the attitudes of the public to the problem of corruption. 
The salience of corruption in the media is described to have a crucial impact on the perceived 
state of corruption by the citizens (Grigorescu 2006) as well as on their electoral behaviour, 
which can be manifested by a refusal to re-elect incumbents who were exposed by the media 
to have been involved in wrongdoings (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010). On the other hand, an 
increased salience of corruption, particularly by constant reporting of high-level scandals, can 
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also lead to the declining of political support (Maier 2010) and of the trust in politics and 
public institutions in general, which may ultimately endanger the stability of political system 
and legitimacy of a democratic regime (Grigorescu 2006: 519). In this respect, some authors 
claim the overstimulation of the public by mediated corruption scandals might have an 
“anesthetic effect”, with the public being increasingly less moved by the permanently present 
stories of corruption in the news. Silvio Waisbord speaks of a gradual “banalization of 
corruption” in Argentina, where “mediated corruption has become so ubiquitous that it hardly 
scandalizes large segments of the public” (Waisbord 2004: 1091). On a similar note, pointing 
to a high presence of corruption allegations in public discourse in Russia, András Sajó 
reminds that “when everyone cries wolf, the public loses all interest in accusations of 
corruption and normalizes it. The very high level of government corruption becomes a 
normal fact of life” (Sajó 2003: 180). 
 
It has already been pointed out by various media scholars (Thompson 2000; Lull and 
Hinerman 1997) that in a market-dominated media environment, revealing moral 
transgressions of the power holders is often driven by far more earthly motives on the side of 
the news organizations than by their desire to serve democracy, and the line between 
performing a watchdog role and manufacturing scandals might be sometimes difficult to 
draw. It is indeed well known that “the media scandal is one proven means to stimulate 
public outrage and corporate profits” (Lull and Hinerman 1997: 29). These concerns 
inevitably point to the issue of the accountability of watchdog journalism, and, in broader 
sense, of the accountability of the media as such. The problem of media accountability, 
defined by Dennis McQuail as “voluntary or involuntary processes by which the media 
answer directly or indirectly to their society for the quality and/or consequences of 
publication” (McQuail 2005: 207), has been ever more frequently raised and debated in the 
recent years, both within the academic discourse (Eberwein et al. 2011; von Krogh 2008) as 
well as among the public, particularly in the Western world, with arguably the most vivid 
discussions sparked by the so-called “hacking scandal” in the UK, which erupted in July 
2011 following the revelation of illegal work practices among journalists from Rupert 
Murdoch’s tabloid News of the World. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the importance of 
asking “who is watching the watchdog” – as the advocates of media accountability rightly do 
– for assessing the actual performance of investigative journalism and its role in enforcing of 
political accountability, it would be beyond the scope of this paper to further elaborate on the 
elaborate on the relationship between these two concepts. This paper is primarily interested in 
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examining whether investigative journalism fulfils its normatively ascribed role in the context 
of (post-)transformation countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially vis-à-vis the 
issue of corruption, and what are the factors which either help or constrain the ability of the 
media to function as an accountability institution. 
 
 
 
2. Corruption, media and accountability in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
For many researchers as well as international organizations, low levels of corruption count to 
the main features of a functioning democratic society and good governance, while high extent 
of corruption is usually linked to various developmental problems, including inequality, 
poverty or low investment levels (Grigorescu 2006). From the point of view of democratic 
theory, political corruption is widely considered to pose a serious threat to democracy and its 
consolidation (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006: 86). Summing up the negative effects of corruption in 
transition countries, Vachudova notes that:  
 
“/.../ corruption impoverishes society by reducing economic growth, undermining entrepreneurship and 
stealing from the state. Corruption also undermines liberal democracy as political elites violate the 
legal limits of their power, citizens lose trust in state institutions and civil society is oppressed or co-
opted by powerful networks” (Vachudova 2009: 44). 
 
In context of Central and Eastern Europe, the rapid spread of corruption after 1989, following 
and accompanying the simultaneous transformation of both political regime and property 
structures, has been related to the absence of (or difficulties in enforcing) the rule of law, as 
well as to the “communist legacy”, characterized by the fuzzy borders between state 
institutions and between the state and society (Holmes 2006: 11). While many have regarded 
this problem as an unavoidable collateral effect of transformation, and expected the extent of 
corruption to decrease in time, alongside with the overall process of democratic 
consolidation, in many parts of the region corruption is still regarded one of the most palpable 
issues the new democracies are coping with, even twenty years after the beginning of 
transformation (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). Not even the process of EU accession managed to 
eradicate the omnipresence of corruption practices among political elites and on various 
levels of state administration, and in several countries (notably in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
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Slovakia, Slovenia) the perception of the extent of corruption has actually increased, rather 
than decreased, since the EU accession, as the data from the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index document (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Corruption perception in CEE countries, 2004-2011 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bulgaria 4.1 4 4 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3 
Slovakia 4 4.3 4.7 4.9 5 4.5 4.3 4 
Latvia 4 4.2 4.7 4.8 5 4.5 4.3 4.2 
Lithuania  4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.9 5 4.8 
Poland 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.6 5 5.3 5.5 
Slovenia 6 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.4 5.9 
Romania 2.9 3 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 
Hungary 4.8 5 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 
Czech Rep. 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.4 
Estonia 6 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 
Avg. 4.39 4.55 4.81 5.01 5.02 4.97 4.84 4.67 
Source: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi  
(Legend: the higher the score the lower the perceived level of corruption) 
 
While the CP index reflects opinions of countries’ experts, the perceived backsliding of the 
political efforts to curb corruption has been largely confirmed by the survey among general 
population, conducted as part of the Global Corruption Barometer. Asked whether the level 
of corruption has decreased or increased in the past three years, most respondents in most 
CEE countries reported the latter, with Romania (87%), Hungary (76%) and Slovenia (73%) 
topping the ranking of citizens’ discontent.   
 
Table 2: % of responses to the question “In the past three years, how has the level of corruption 
in this country changed?” 
 Decreased Stayed the same Increased 
Bulgaria 28 42 30 
Czech Republic 14 42 44 
Hungary 4 20 76 
Latvia 9 36 55 
Lithuania 8 29 63 
Poland 26 45 29 
Romania 2 11 87 
Slovenia 5 22 73 
Source: Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2010) 
  
Although the above reported perceptions of corruption are not unique to citizens of Central 
and Eastern European countries (for example, 70% of Germans are convinced corruption has 
increased, too) and might not be entirely reliable indicators of what the “real” levels of 
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corruption are, they still have real-term political effects – quite in line with the sociological 
“definition of the situation”.1 It has been demonstrated that perception of corruption has an 
impact on voting behaviour (Slomczynski – Shabad 2011), and the high salience of the issue 
of corruption in public discourse has certainly contributed to the rise of numerous new 
political parties across the CEE region in the last several years, riding on the wave of anti-
corruption rhetoric.
2
 Following a popular demand, governments have established various 
agencies and launched campaigns and programmes nominally tackling corruption, however 
apparently without significant effects (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006), and sometimes even being 
dismissed as counter-productive (Krastev and Ganev 2003).  
 
The rising levels of corruption perception in Central and Eastern Europe in the past several 
years, as documented above, bring forth the question of the role of the media in handling this 
phenomenon and enforcing accountability of politicians and public officials found guilty of 
such behaviour. This question clearly cannot be discussed outside of the overall context of 
media systems transformation in the new democracies of this region after 1989, which has 
shaped and determined the structural features of the news media markets as well as the 
character of journalistic cultures and qualities of media performance. While acknowledging 
important differences among the national media systems, scholarship on media 
transformation in CEE usually agrees that overall, news media in the region are 
characterized, among others, by low institutional autonomy, high political parallelism, low 
(and ever more declining) journalistic professionalization, and increasing tabloidization of 
media content (e.g. Jakubowicz – Sükösd 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska – Glowacki, 2008; 
Zielonka – Mancini 2011; Gross et al. 2012), which are all qualities rather unfavourable for 
the development and firm establishment of the accountability role of journalism. As Katrin 
Voltmer puts it,   
 
“the media in many new democracies often seem to lack the qualities that would qualify them 
                                                          
 
1
 The term “definition of the situation” (or the “Thomas theorem”) was coined by the American sociologist 
William I. Thomas in 1928.  According to Thomas, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 571-572). 
 
2
 Pursuit of strong anti-corruption agenda helped the Law and Justice party, headed by the Kaczynski brothers, 
to win the elections in Poland in 2005. The Romanian president Traian Basescu (2004- ) has always used 
aggressive anti-corruption rhetoric as his main weapon in combat against political opponents and instrument in 
gaining popularity among the voters. In the Czech Republic, the newly-established Public Affairs party gained 
over 10% of votes in the 2010 elections almost solely based on the promise of ending the corrupt practices of 
established political parties (with whom it nevertheless sealed a coalition right after the elections). 
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for playing a key role in promoting accountability and inclusive politics. They are frequently 
criticized for remaining too close to political power holders to be able to act as effective 
watchdogs; political reporting is regarded as too opinionated to provide balanced gatekeeping; 
while commercial pressures on news coverage often encourage an overemphasizes on the 
trivial and popular at the expense of serious and sustained attention to international affairs and 
complex issues on the policy agenda” (Voltmer 2009: 137-138). 
 
Given the frequent structural intertwinnement of media, business and politics in the region 
and the subsequent problem of instrumentalization of media by their owners to promote their 
political or business interests (Stetka 2012; Örnebring 2012), many have raised doubts about 
the capability of the media to play the watchdog role and act as “credible actors” to denounce 
corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). This has been particularly pointed out in relation to 
Bulgaria and Romania, where practices of scandalizing of political opponents by publishing 
information in allied media about their alleged corruption are rather well-known and 
documented (e.g. Coman, 2010). 
 
However, despite its apparent importance for understanding whether and how political 
accountability is enforced in consolidating democracies, the watchdog role of the media in 
Central and Eastern Europe appears to be surprisingly under-studied area. Existing studies are 
usually limited to a general qualitative assessment of the media performance in a given 
country (e.g. Jakubowicz – Sükösd 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska – Glowacki 2008; Klimkiewicz 
2010; Gross et al. 2012, for the most recent examples), while systematic, empirical research 
is scarce. In relation to the issue of media reporting on corruption, possibly the only empirical 
study with a pan-regional scope was conducted by Alexandru Grigorescu (2006) who found, 
using a frequency analysis of a sample of news content, that there has indeed been a 
significant increase in the media salience of corruption in East-Central Europe over the 
course of ten years – a “corruption eruption”, as he terms it – starting in the late 1990s, which 
he attributed to the increasing number and activities of “powerful international organizations 
that have become involved in this realm” (Grigorescu 2006: 547). However, while making a 
link between the IOs pressure, amplified by the media, and the establishment of various 
anticorruption mechanisms and policies by many governments in CEE in the given time 
period, Grigorescu also warned against the short-lived effects of such pressures and a 
possible growth in disillusionment on the side of the public, should the anticorruption efforts 
not bring significant progress. As he writes,  
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“If the newly created anticorruption mechanisms are perceived to be ineffective, the feeling of 
helplessness will sink in. Even if the region may not experience reversals of democracy, such 
apathy may nevertheless lead to a continuous erosion of democratic norms by corruption” 
(Grigorescu 2006: 549). 
 
Looking at the recent tendencies in corruption perception in CEE, these can be seen as 
prophetic words, and a further incentive for studying whether and how the media engage in 
combating corruption and contribute to increasing political accountability, especially in the 
period following the European Union accession when the intensity and effect of the EU 
leverage tends to subside (Vachudova 2009). This paper attempts to shed some light on these 
issues and partly fill the gap in existing CEE media scholarship by comparatively examining 
the perceived effects of investigative journalism in eight countries of the region, as well as by 
exploring, by means of a case study, the possible relationship between the media salience of 
corruption and the trends in prosecution of corruption in the Czech Republic. Drawing on the 
results from both parts of the empirical study, the paper concludes with a proposition of a 
model of relationship between the media and the other accountability institutions, a “virtuous 
network” of actors mutually reinforcing each other in their effort to curb political corruption. 
 
 
3. Methodological background 
 
In terms of empirical material, the paper utilizes data gathered through a mixed-method 
approach. The data on the perceived effects of investigative journalism were obtained as part 
of a broader study on the state and performance of investigative journalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe,
3
 conducted in 2012 together with Henrik Örnebring and using a combination 
of an expert survey and in-depth interviews with investigative journalists in the region. The 
expert survey was conducted in nine CEE countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) among 57 respondents with a 
first-hand experience with investigative journalism, who have either worked as investigative 
journalists/reporters themselves, or have been systematically observing this area as media 
                                                          
3
 The study itself originated from the ERC-funded project “Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe” (2009-2013). 
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scholars, commentators or activists.
4
 For the initial sample, ten experts in each of the nine 
CEE countries were identified, with an attempt to safeguard an approximate balance between 
active journalists on the one side, and academics and commentators on the other. The 39 per 
cent response rate (achieved after two reminders) was further increased by including 
responses from 18 journalists who were interviewed face-to-face and asked the same 
questions as those contained in the questionnaire (in addition to discussing other topics). On 
average, there were six responses per country, which can be regarded an acceptable rate 
compared with results achieved by other expert surveys in comparative politics (Huber and 
Inglehart 1995; Ray 1999). However, the two questions related to the practical effect of 
investigative journalism, which this paper draws on, were answered by less than four experts 
in the Czech Republic, and therefore (following Huber and Inglehart 1995) the country was 
taken out of the comparison for this particular level of analysis.    
 
Because of the issue of data availability, the analysis of the media salience of corruption and 
its relationship to the tendencies in prosecution of corruption was conducted only in one 
country – the Czech Republic – and can therefore serve merely as a case study whose results 
are only tentative, and will yet have to be tested in other countries of the region. The case 
study utilized frequency analysis of the issue of corruption in selected Czech news media 
over the period of six years (2005-2011). The data were gathered partly from the Lexis/Nexis 
database, partly from online archives of other available media outlets. In addition, official 
reports and statistics produced by the Police of the Czech Republic were used to document 
the development of prosecution of various criminal offences subsumed under the 
“corruption” label.  
 
 
 
4. Watchdogs that don’t bite? Limited powers of investigative journalism in CEE 
 
In the expert survey, political impact of investigative journalism was examined by asking the 
respondents to estimate the number of high-profile public officials who have in the last five 
years a) been forced to step down from their position, and b) who have been sentenced by a 
                                                          
4
 The composition of the sample was as follows: Bulgaria: 6 experts (3 journalists / 3 academics); Czech 
Republic 5 (2/3), Estonia 4 (1/3), Hungary 7 (5/2), Latvia 9 (5/4), Lithuania 6 (3/3), Poland 6 (3/3), Romania 6 
(3/3), Slovakia 8 (5/3).  
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court, in both cases following an investigative article or series of investigative reports.
5
  
 
Table 3: Estimated number of public officials punished for corruption following 
investigative news reports in the last five years 
  Officials stepping down Officials sentenced 
 Corruption 
perception 
(TI, 2011)
a
 
Range (mean) Range (mean) 
Bulgaria 3.3 0-2 (1) 0-2 (0.3) 
Estonia 6.4 4-10 (7) 1-2 (1.5) 
Hungary 4.6 1-5 (2.4) 0-3 (0.6) 
Latvia 4.2 0-20 (6.1) 0 
Lithuania 4.8 0-5 (3) 0-3 (0.5) 
Poland 5.5 5-7 (5.3) 0-5 (3.3) 
Romania 3.6 1-3 (2.5) n.a. 
Slovakia 4 1-8 (3.5) 0-3 (0.6) 
      N=52 
a
 the lower the value, the higher the perceived corruption in a country 
 
As it can be clearly seen from the results, summarized in Table 3, the direct effects of 
investigative stories are estimated to be very weak in almost all the countries in the sample. 
The relatively low numbers of officials who were forced to step down following an exposure 
of their corrupt behaviour – less than five in most countries over the five year period – are a 
telling indicator itself, particularly in relation to the high levels of perceived corruption in 
these countries. It has been frequently pointed out in the interviews that officials who were 
revealed to be corrupt often remain in their seats, regardless of the media pressure, or leave 
only temporarily to come back later when media interest has moved on to other things. 
However, what seems even more daunting, at least from the perspective of the expected 
accountability function of the media, is the estimated number of officials sentenced by courts 
for their actions following an investigative story. It is clear that in most countries, even if 
politicians are forced to step down and court proceedings are initiated against them, only 
rarely does this lead to sentencing. In most countries, barely one person has been sentenced in 
the last five years following a journalistic investigation; the only exception seems to be 
Poland with about three people sentenced during that time frame. Looking at the scores on 
the TI’s Corruption Perception Index, there seems to be an inverse relationship – the 
                                                          
5
 The exact wording of the two questions was following: A) Concerning the impact of investigative journalism, 
approximately how many cases in the last 5 years can you recall in [YOUR COUNTRY] of high-profile public 
officials losing power (e.g. by stepping down / being removed from office, even if only temporarily) for their 
actions which have been first exposed by an investigative article or report (series of articles/reports)? B)       
Likewise, approximately how many cases in the last 5 years can you recall in [YOUR COUNTRY] of high-
profile public officials being sentenced by a court for their actions which have been first exposed by an 
investigative article or report (series of articles/reports)? (Stetka – Örnebring 2012). 
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countries displaying the highest levels of perceived corruption are those where investigative 
journalism yields the lowest practical effects (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia), while in those 
countries where corruption is currently not perceived as such a big problem (Estonia, 
Poland), investigative journalism is more likely to remove corrupt officials from their posts, 
and the courts are more likely to penalize such media-exposed behaviour.
6
 The country with a 
seemingly biggest discrepancy between the number of officials stepping down (6) and the 
number of them being sentenced (0) following investigative reporting is Latvia, which has 
been attributed by one of the respondents to the often dubious course and lengthy duration of 
the court processes, inevitably resulting in a declining public attention to the case:  
 
“/.../ It also has to be noted that the way from being accused to being sentenced is awfully 
long, and at the end [it] does not feel as fair trial. The prime example is Mayor of Ventspils, 
Aivars Lembergs, whose misconduct has been exposed in media much longer than he has 
been investigated, but as the saga is dragging on for years, everyone has forgotten what he is 
tried about.”7  
 
The weakness or lack of autonomy of other accountability institutions, notably the courts and 
the police, have been quoted by other respondents as explanations for the low effects of 
journalistic investigations as well. One Slovak respondent pointed to how the police cannot or 
do not make proper use of the information collected and published by the media.
8
 Adding a 
personal experience with the ineffectiveness of the courts in Bulgaria, where investigative 
journalism seems to have the least effect of all the countries in the sample, the local 
investigative journalist Rossen Bossev claimed:  
 
“Twice a year, I'm called to go to the prosecutor in order to give information about the articles 
I wrote because they have opened investigation based on the facts that I have revealed. But 
after that, past one two years and nothing happens, so [that means] there was no political 
decision to tag those people”.9  
                                                          
6
 In Poland, investigative journalism has, directly or more indirectly (as one of several factors), led to the 
downfall of several leading politicians. The most notable case in this regard is probably the so-called Hazard 
Scandal (Afera hazardowa, 2009; referring to illicit political lobbying in connection with the 1992 changes in 
the Gambling and Betting Act, revealed only in 2009) that led to the firing or resignation of a number of 
political officials including Zbigniew Chlebowski (Chair of the Parliamentary Group of Civic Platform), 
Miroslaw Drzewiecki (Minister of Sport), Grzegorz Schetyna (Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Interior), Andrzej Czuma (Minister of Justice), and others (Stetka – Örnebring 2012). 
7
 Respondent ID_17, Latvia. 
8
 Respondent ID_51, Slovakia 
9
 Interview with Rossen Bossev, Sofia, 18 September 2012 
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The point about political factors ultimately determining the consequences of journalistic 
investigations was made by several other respondents, particularly in Romania, Slovakia or 
Hungary. According to one Slovak respondent, “...there were cases of ministers resigning, put 
it was more likely due to ‘political games’ rather than media/public pressure”.10 In the 
opinion of one Hungarian journalist, the question of autonomy of investigative journalism has 
always be taking into account: “[It is] difficult to discern cases where leaks were a prelude in 
some power game from real instances of investigative journalism bringing officials down”.11 
The shared opinion seems to be that investigative journalism alone does not have enough 
power to enforce political accountability: “an exquisite investigative story, most of the time, 
/.../ is not enough to have somebody removed from the office,” as one of the respondents 
from Romania put it.
12
 Likewise, respondents have reminded that “...removal very seldom is 
direct consequence of exposure in media, more often a favourable co-incidence of several 
factors (exposure, political climate, societal pressure)”.13 In the opinion of one of the leading 
Slovak investigative journalist, Marek Vagovic, the inability of the media to keep a case on 
the agenda for a prolonged period of time – an inability caused by the media organizations’ 
lack of resources to pursue such long-term stories – leads to many scandals being simply 
dropped after some time, which is a fact the politicians have gotten used to:  
 
“There are many scandals which simply evaporate; it all depends on whether the medium 
keeps pushing it, or if it is able to do so at all /.../ But there are only few [investigative] 
journalists, and they have to work on many things at once, so they don’t really have time to 
drag the case and follow it; they might try for two, three days, and then it fades away. This is 
why the politicians count on that.”14  
 
This does not go without an impact on the journalists, either; according to one of the 
Romanian investigative journalists, Paul Radu, “if you will talk to majority of investigative 
reporters, they are going to say that they are frustrated /.../ So such a wonderful job and 
nothing happens“.15 Seconding this opinion, the Czech investigative reporter Filip Černý 
confessed that “if you have been working on a certain issue for five years and there has been 
                                                          
10
 Respondent ID_12, Slovakia 
11
 Respondent ID_19, Hungary 
12
 Respondent ID_47, Romania 
13
 Respondent ID_17, Latvia 
14
 Interview with Marek Vagovic, Skype conversation, 25 September 2012 
15
 Interview with Paul Radu, Bucharest, 28 September 2012. 
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no change in the society, it is immensely frustrating”.16 
 
 
 
 
5. Fighting corruption in the Czech Republic: changing of the tides? 
 
The above summarized information obtained through both the expert survey and the in-depth 
interviews paints a fairly bleak picture of the watchdog role of media in Central and Eastern 
Europe (with the exception of Estonia and, possibly, Poland), whose ability to enforce 
accountability in relation to political corruption is, by and large, significantly limited, if 
existing at all. However, there seems to be an important conclusion coming out of the 
interviews and experts’ opinions, namely that the pressure exerted by the media, even if 
persistent and stemming from high-quality investigative work (which itself is an exception 
rather than rule), is unlikely to bear any fruit if not complemented by the proper functioning 
of other accountability institutions, most importantly the police and the courts. This is a 
proposition which I am now going to further explore, by means of a case study, in the 
empirical context of the Czech Republic, a country where the battle against corruption has 
recently increased both in intensity and visibility.  
 
To an external observer who got used to the conventional narrative of the Czech Republic as 
one of the frontrunners of the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe and an 
example of a successfully consolidated democracy, it might come as a surprise that 
corruption is currently perceived by the citizens as the country’s single most important social 
problem, having overcome criminality and unemployment which used to dominate the polls 
during the past two decades (Burianek 2012).
17
 The percentage of the population displaying 
an agreement with the statement that “the Czech Republic is a corrupt state” has been 
progressively increasing over the last decade, reaching 79 per cent in the last survey in 2009; 
according to the polling agency (see Mravec 2012), the level of agreement was higher among 
people on executive positions, among entrepreneurs and self-employed, as well as among 
respondents with higher education (see Graph 1).  
                                                          
16
 Interview with Filip Černý,  Prague, 12 July 2012. 
17
 The data come from the European Social Survey, conducted in the Czech Republic in February 2011 
(Burianek 2012). 
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Graph 1: Perceived level of corruption in the Czech Republic (% of cumulative agreement with the statement 
“Czech Republic is a corrupt state”) 
 
Source: Mravec (2012), based on a representative survey by GfK  
 
 
The sharp increase in perceived corruption in the late 2000s is confirmed by other polls, for 
example by a survey conducted among the owners of small and mid-sized companies, an 
overwhelming majority (65 per cent) of whom identified the period between 2006 and 2009 
as an era of the highest corruption in the history of the country (AMSP CR, 2010).
18
 The 
above presented scores on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
show a notable decline over the course of the last several years as well (even if slightly 
delayed compared to the other data), from 5.2 in 2007-2008 to 4.4 in 2011, which means the 
Czech Republic has slid back on the ranking among other CEE countries from the 3
rd
 place in 
2008 down to the 6
th
 place in 2011, leaving only Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 
behind. 
 
These empirical figures (albeit often of a rather “soft” nature, given the fact that they measure 
perceptions rather than the actual phenomenon itself) are further complemented by highly 
critical assessment of reputed experts or international media which have started taking note of 
the extent of corruption in the country. Commenting on a corruption scandal which erupted in 
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 The survey was conducted among 547 respondents, owners of companies with 5-250 employees. The second 
most voted period of highest corruption in the history of the Czech Republic (11.7 per cent of respondents) was 
the period between 1995-2000; only 0.7 per cent selected the period between 2001-2005 (AMSP CR 2010).  
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2010 at the Ministry of Environment,
19
 the Chair of the Board of the Czech branch of 
Transparency International, Václav Láska, claimed that “corruption [in the Czech Republic] 
has become part of the functioning of the political system, leading to the fact that the actors 
within this system have started perceiving it as something natural”.20 In November 2011, an 
article in The Economist has described the situation in the country by using the term “state 
capture” (defined by Anna Grzymala-Buse as “the elite extraction of state resources for 
private gain”, see Grzymala-Buse 2008) and claimed that the Czech leaders have since the 
1989 “enjoyed a two-decade power trip that has made them arrogant and corrupt”.21 
 
The above documented tendency in rising levels of perceived corruption in the Czech 
Republic necessitates the questions of how salient the issue of corruption is in the Czech 
news media, and whether there is any response to this trend on the side of other 
accountability institutions, namely police and the judiciary.  
 
In order to explore the first question, I have conducted a frequency analysis of the issue of 
corruption in selected Czech news media over the period of six years (2005-2011). Both the 
time frame and the particular news outlets (dailies Lidove Noviny, Pravo and Hospodarske 
noviny, and weeklies Respekt and Ekonom) were chosen based on public availability of the 
electronic archives (Lexis/Nexis in case of Lidove Noviny and Pravo, and online archives in 
case of the other three papers). The articles were harvested using a keyword “corruption” and 
its most frequent variations in Czech language (“korupce”, “korupční“, “korupci”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The scandal which concerned illegal party financing through the Ministry’s funds was revealed by the former 
Head of the State Environmental Fund, Libor Michálek, and let to resignation of the Minister of Environment 
Pavel Drobil. However, while Michálek – as a whistleblower – was forced to step down from his position 
following the scandal, the ex-Minister Drobil was subsequently ‘promoted’ by his Civic Democratic Party into 
the role of a Head of its Programme Section shortly after. The case ended without any criminal charges.     
 
20
 From http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/110070-transparency-international-korupce-se-v-cesku-stala-
samozrejmosti/ , last accessed on 25 February 2013. 
 
21
 From http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/czech-politics , last accessed on 25 
February 2013. 
 
16 
 
 
Graph 2: Salience of corruption in the selected Czech news media (2005-2011) 
(number of articles mentioning the word “corruption”) 
 
Source: Lexis/Nexis database (http://lexisnexis.com); online news archives 
 
 
The frequency analysis reveals that there has indeed been a significant increase of articles 
about corruption in the Czech news media in the last two years of the observed period (2010-
2011). While the salience of corruption has been more or less steadily rising over the entire 
period in case of the two weeklies (Respekt and Ekonom), in case of the three dailies, the 
interest in reporting about corruption first peaked in 2006 (the year of parliamentary 
elections), gradually declining afterwards for the next three- to four years before climbing 
sharply up again in 2010, when another parliamentary elections took place (Hospodarske 
Noviny) or the year after (Pravo and Lidove Noviny). This difference means that unlike in 
2006, the rise of news mentioning corruption cannot be attributed solely to the election 
campaign, especially since the number of articles has continued to climb up even after the 
elections, quite contrary to the development during the previous election term. In other 
words, the data reveal that the news agenda must have been constructed following other 
events and issues, not just rhetorical clashes of political parties and their leaders before the 
elections. 
 
The interviewed Czech investigative journalists and experts confirmed they have also noticed 
a significant rise of the anti-corruption agenda in the media, as well as in the public discourse 
in general, in course of the last couple of years. Although investigative journalism as a genre 
is not considered particularly prominent in the Czech news media – a fact merely confirmed 
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by the expert survey, with an average estimate of fifteen investigative journalists and between 
six and seven media outlets pursuing investigative journalism, at least occasionally (see 
Stetka – Ornebring 2012)22 – the willingness of the media to open corruption scandals and 
expose moral transgressions of public officials is perceived as visibly greater than just several 
years ago. According Radim Bureš from Transparency International, “there is a stronger 
interest in and greater motivation to write about [corruption], either in a form of reprinted 
information or based on an exclusive analysis /.../ If you compare the current state with the 
situation during Mirek Topolanek’s government [2006-2009] the difference is absolutely 
obvious”.23 In the opinion of Jaroslav Spurny from the investigative weekly Respekt, the 
increase in the salience of corruption in the media can be explained partly by the fact that 
“the journalists are more curious”, partly by the rise of a number of civil society 
organizations (as well as professionalization of the existing ones) which have the fight 
against corruption on their agenda. The importance of civic initiatives and NGOs for flagging 
the issue of corruption and giving courage to others to make a stand against corrupt 
politicians has also been mentioned by Istvan Leko, the editor-in-chief of CzechPosition.cz 
(an online daily with an investigative scope), pointing out that many of these initiatives were 
founded by private entrepreneurs who simply got “fed up” with the long-established corrupt 
system and decided to do something to change it.
 24
 However, apart from raising the anti-
corruption agenda in the public discourse, the NGOs have often been instrumental to 
journalists by producing high-quality studies and reports on particular topics. According to 
Jaroslav Spurny,  
 
“The journalists have an easier work because of that. If I want to write about ČEZ [the state-
owned electricity producer] and solar energy, all I need to do is to look at the website of 
EPS
25
 where I can find things which I would otherwise have to inquire about for maybe two 
                                                          
22
 Among the most often quoted representatives of Czech mainstream media with an investigative profile there 
were the weekly Respekt, the leading quality daily Mladá fronta DNES, and the public service TV station Česká 
televize (with its weekly investigative programme Reporters of CT).  
 
23
 Interview with Radim Bureš, Prague, 12 April 2012. 
 
24
 Interview with Istvan Leko, Prague, 2 May 2012. Among these newly established initiatives, the most visible 
probably are the “Foundation against corruption”, founded in 2011 by several entrepreneurs headed by a multi-
millionaire financier Karel Janecek; the anti-corruption movement “ANO 2011”, founded by the second-richest 
Czech businessman Andrej Babis, which has since its establishment transformed into a political party; or the 
initiative “Change the politicians”, aiming to achieve a systemic change by encouraging people to vote 
individual corrupt politicians out of their offices.  
 
25
 EPS is an abbreviation for the Environmental Law Service, an NGO focusing at environmental a human rights 
issues, as well as on corruption and public governance.  
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weeks, with an uncertain result”.26 
 
In addition to the mushrooming of anti-corruption NGOs and a growing public interest in the 
problem of corruption, the interviewees have pointed to another, and possibly crucial, factor 
which not only keeps the topic high on the news agenda but which is also indispensable in 
enforcing accountability, namely the increasing activity of the police and the courts, and their 
greater willingness to prosecute corruption. According to the investigative journalist Filip 
Černý, there has been a “great emancipation of the police and the justice” in the last couple of 
years in the Czech Republic, with “the police starting to investigate things which have 
appeared in the media. This has never been the case before”.27 The gradual process of de-
politicization of the police and prosecution authorities, which has started after the 2010 
elections, has been reported to bear fruits, as various politically sensitive cases were opened 
and pursued which would most likely have been dropped before. This claim about a recent 
increase in prosecution of corruption by the state authorities can be supported by official 
statistical figures, as summarized in the following Graph 3: 
 
Graph 3: Number of criminal acts related to corruption in the Czech Republic 
 
Source: Police of the Czech Republic (2012) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
26
 Interview with Jaroslav Spurny, Prague, 15 July 2012. 
27
 Interview with Filip Černý, Prague, 12 July 2012. 
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The graph documents a sharp increase not only in the number of corruption acts
28
 which were 
investigated as well as clarified by the police from 2010 on, but also a notable rise of the 
corruption cases ending with a charge (by 45 per cent from 2010 to 2011). The increase in the 
number of court sentences for corruption acts has been a bit more moderate in comparison to 
the other three figures, but still quite prominent (from 151 sentences in 2010 to 184 in 2011). 
In addition to this, data from other sources confirm the heightened activity of prosecution 
agencies regarding high-profile corruption in the Czech Republic; the specialized police Unit 
for Discovering Corruption and Economic Criminality has recorded a noteworthy growth in 
the number of people prosecuted for corruption in the last couple of years (from 58 in 2008 to 
159 in 2011).
29
 Adding yet another indicator, it can be pointed out that between 2011 and 
2012, twelve high-level politicians (MPs, senators and ministers) were charged by the police 
for criminal offenses (including corruption), which is more than the cumulative figure for the 
previous seven years.
30
   
 
 
6. A tale of two countries: enforcing political accountability in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia 
 
The above described trends appear to have a reinforcing effect on the investigative work of 
the Czech journalists, who are reported to be taken more seriously by the politicians than 
before. Previously, according to Jaroslav Spurny, the politicians “used to laugh in our face, 
and they would not talk to us about it [corruption] at all. They had the police and state 
prosecution authority under their thumb and did not give a damn about the journalists. /.../ 
They knew that I could write an article which will not give them a good name, but at the 
same time, they also knew that I could not do anything else, and that the police will not pick 
that up.” However, following the personal and institutional changes in both the police and the 
prosecution office after 2010, leading to changing performance of both institutions, “the 
politicians /.../ have suddenly been thrown off their balance. They don’t know what the police 
will find out about them. /.../ They have realised they are not exempt from punishment”.31 
This atmosphere might be affecting high-profile businessmen as well, as suggested by 
                                                          
28
 The police statistics on corruption prosecution compile five particular criminal acts which are most commonly 
labelled as corruption, namely the abuse of public authority; misfeasance in public office; accepting a bribe; 
bribery; and indirect bribery. 
29
 http://www.policie.cz/soubor/jaroslav-ibehej-uokfk-2012.aspx , last accessed 25 February 2013. 
30
 http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/trestnecinypolitiku , last accessed 25 February 2013. 
31
 Interview with Jaroslav Spurny, Prague, 15 July 2012. 
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another journalist commenting on the recent suicide of one of the Czech coal barons who was 
being prosecuted for corruption and tunnelling; posing a rhetorical question whether other 
entrepreneurs with murky business histories should now fear for their properties, Jaroslav 
Plesl from the weekly Reflex replied:  
“The answer is: they should. Compared to the previous twenty years, something has finally 
changed in the Czech society”.32 
 
The question, of course, still remains what exactly has triggered this “change in the society”, 
and how much did the media contribute to it. While this study has described simultaneously 
rising tendencies in the media salience of the issue of corruption and in criminal prosecution 
of corruption in the Czech Republic, both in the context of significantly increasing perception 
of corruption among the Czech public as well as of growing number of anti-corruption 
NGOs, the scope and character of data unfortunately does not enable for drawing any kind of 
path-dependency model, so this question has to remain without a clear-cut answer – if there 
is, in fact, any at all.  Instead, it seems plausible to argue that all these tendencies reveal an 
intertwined system of various accountability institutions which have a mutually reinforcing 
effect on each other’s performance; and vice-versa, a system in which deficiency, low 
independence or lack of activity of the individual institutions weaken the effect of the rest. It 
is possible to argue that without a systematic, long-term pressure by the media and the civil 
society, a change of attitude towards corruption on the side of the institutions of horizontal 
accountability – the government, police or the judiciary – appears much more difficult to 
achieve. On the other hand, without properly and independently operating prosecution 
authorities as well as the judiciary, media pressure itself is unlikely to safeguard visible, 
systemic changes, and can even lead to disillusionment and decline of the public interest, as 
discussed at the beginning of this paper.  
 
This difference can be perhaps best illustrated by contrasting the situation in the Czech 
Republic with the one in the neighbouring Slovakia. According to the local journalists, the 
main problem with the accountability role of Slovak media is that it frequently hits the wall 
of the prosecution authorities and the judiciary, which are reported to be captured by 
clientelist political-business networks and therefore do not properly function as institutions of 
democratic accountability. As a result, not only do the investigative stories brought by the 
                                                          
32
 http://www.reflex.cz/clanek/nazory/49841/jaroslav-plesl-uhlobaron-mekota-neunesl-tlak-vysetrovani-bat-by-
se-meli-i-dalsi-kmotri.html , last accessed 28 March 2013. 
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media very rarely end up at the court, much less with a sentence (see Table 3), but the 
politicians, public officials as well as high-profile businessmen have also adopted a habit of 
suing the media for libel as an almost automatic response to publishing of reports revealing 
their wrongdoings (see Belakova 2013; Vagovič 2012). With the courts routinely deciding in 
favour of the complainants, imposing high, potentially damaging fines on the publishers and 
broadcasters, and even prosecuting the reporters themselves, the willingness of news media 
as well as individual journalists to push their watchdog role has been significantly dampened. 
The respondents in the expert survey have noted the chilling effect of this judicial practice 
particularly on commercial TV stations. According to one of the respondents:   
 
“In last 3 years all commercial TV stations stopped producing their investigative programmes. 
These were of good quality and were regular winners of journalistic awards. However, they 
attracted lawsuits.”33 
 
However, print media are by no means less affected, as confirmed by the personal account of 
Zuzana Petková, an investigative journalist at Hospodarske noviny:  
 
“Although I am doing this [investigative reporting] knowing that accusations, interrogations, 
courts and prosecutions belong to the job, if there are too many of these, it drives one away. 
Even the publishers begin to consider what to publish, and in what form. /.../ When you start 
writing with the thought of not causing financial problems to the company, that is not a good 
motivation” (quoted in Vagovič 2012). 
 
This situation is particularly well exemplified by the so-far outcomes of the scandal 
“Gorilla”, a code name for a wiretapping operation carried out by the Slovak secret service 
between 2005-2006. Despite the fact that the transcripts from the wiretaps have been known 
to the significant part of the Slovak media, including the leading quality daily SME, for 
several years, none of them picked them up, allegedly because of the fears from law suits.
34
 
In the end, the transcripts were leaked on internet in December 2011, instantly causing a big 
uproar on the political scene and leading to a series of mass demonstrations, as the leaks 
revealed large-scale corruption reaching to the very top of the entire Slovak political scene. 
                                                          
33
 Respondent ID_31, Slovakia. This opinion was shared by another respondent, according to whom “strong 
regulation and often penalties causes decrease of investigative [programmes] in major TV channels” 
(Respondent ID_26, Slovakia) 
 
34
 Interview with Milan Šimečka, Bratislava, 10 July 2012. 
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While direct impact on the individual political actors involved in the scandal has been very 
little, and the police investigation has gradually faded away without anybody being 
prosecuted, the investigative journalist Tom Nicholson who published a book based on the 
leaked transcripts (see Nicholson 2012) ended up facing multiple lawsuits filed by the key 
persons mentioned in the transcript, who are all suing him for libel. As Nicholson puts it, 
  
“They feel totally untouchable. It is entirely absurd that it could be me who might go to 
prison, and not the actors of Gorilla. How dare they are? First, they steel billions, and then 
they sue the journalists who have written about it?” (quoted in Vagovič 2012). 
 
In the opinion of Milan Šimečka, journalist and former editor-in-chief of the Slovak daily 
SME, the Gorilla scandal highlighted the difference between the current performance of 
media as well as other accountability mechanisms in the Czech Republic and Slovakia:  
 
“The Czechs did not have ‘Gorilla’, but instead there has been a permanent pressure by some 
of the media which have been bringing ever new scandals until it became apparent that the 
base of the entire system started shaking. The concentrated pressure by the society and the 
media, not just through one scandal but through many which have documented how corrupt 
the system is, this pressure seems to have awaken the courts, the police, as well as the media 
themselves, so now it looks like the politicians have really been trapped. I think the Czech 
Republic demonstrates that if there is a concentrated effort, it will bear fruit”.35 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Even if the long-term effects of this “concentrated effort” of the accountability institutions in 
the Czech Republic still remain to be seen, the tendencies observed in the last couple of years 
give reason for a cautious optimism, and partly balance out the critical assessment of the 
watchdog role of the media in the CEE region as a whole, as presented above. Although the 
data limit the possibility of a proper comparative analysis across the region, the interviews 
indicate that the main difference between the Czech Republic and some of the other CEE 
countries lies in the fact that in the former country, increasing media salience of corruption is 
supported and further fuelled by the simultaneous activities of parts of the society and the 
                                                          
35
 Interview with Milan Šimečka, Bratislava, 10 July 2012. 
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state, particularly the NGOs, police and the courts, which all have been showing greater 
interest in fighting corruption and exposing and sanctioning the wrongdoings of public 
officials. This suggests that the accountability role of the media in Central and Eastern 
Europe has to be analyzed within a broader context of the functioning of other accountability 
mechanisms and institutions, instead of focusing primarily at the performance and effects of 
the media and the investigative journalism themselves – a conclusion confirming some 
general observation on political accountability, which according to Silvio Waisbord “hinges 
on the combined actions of a network of institutions rather than on the solitary actions of one 
organization” (Waisbord 2000: 229). 
This perspective, of course, does not diminish the importance of the news media, and 
investigative journalism in particular, for the overall effort of many of the post-transition 
societies to curb political corruption and improve political accountability. Even if their exact 
contribution to this process might rarely be possible to determine, it is beyond doubt that 
without their active participation – both by an increased salience of the issue of corruption as 
well as by more detailed, sustained coverage of particular corruption cases, the cumulative 
effect of the whole accountability network would arguably be weaker. This reminder seems 
even more relevant in the times of gradual diminishing and weakening of investigative 
journalism in many Central and Eastern Europe, especially since the beginning of the 
economic crisis in 2007/2008 which has put news media organizations under an 
unprecedented pressure and resulted often in trimming down the media’s investigative 
departments (Rudusa 2010; Salovaara and Juzefovics 2012; Stetka and Örnebring 2012) and 
made media generally more vulnerable towards political and economic pressures (Stetka 
2012). These processes can certainly have a chilling effect on the democratic performance of 
journalism, and may contribute to silencing of the attempts to hold politicians and other 
power holders accountable (as indeed documented above on the Slovak case). Still, while 
freedom and autonomy must undoubtedly be protected as basic preconditions for the media to 
perform their normatively ascribed watchdog role, we also have to bear in mind that it is only 
through the effective performance of the other institutions that the watchdogs of democracy 
actually gain the power to bite.   
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